FIN 48 is an interpretation that was meant to provide clarity around certain aspects of FAS109, specifically, the computation and disclosure of Uncertain Tax Positions ("UTPs"). As such, FIN 48 is an integral part of FAS 109 and needs to be considered within the tax provision work flow. Under FIN 48, UTPs formerly computed under FAS 5 must now be reviewed under new standards for identification, probability, computation, and disclosure. Once this has been done, the results need to be fully integrated with the rest of the tax provision.
Originally, taxes were levied to pay for government expenses. But they underwent a malignant transformation. They began to be used to express social preferences. Tax revenues were diverted to pay for urban renewal, to encourage foreign investments through tax breaks and tax incentives, to enhance social equality by evenly redistributing income and so on. As Big Government became more derided - so were taxes perceived to be its instrument and the tide turned. Suddenly, the fashion was to downsize government, minimize its disruptive involvement in the marketplace and reduce the total tax burden as part of the GNP.
Integration of UTPs with the current taxes payable account presents special challenges. Before FIN 48, tax reserves computed under FAS 5 were typically recorded in the current payable on the theory that the government could demand payment at any time. This meant that refunds and payments due with the filing of the return were co-mingled in the ending balances. Past FIN 48, these items are still included in the ending balances; however, the movement in the UTPs must be disclosed in a separate roll forward using the following prescribed categories: Beg Balance, PY Increase, PY Decrease, CY Increase, CY Decrease, Settlements Expiration.
Recently, however, some have begun to explore in more detail the theoretical framework linking VAT, tariff reform, trade and welfare, turning up some interesting and to some extent disquieting results. Analysts have also recently begun to discuss the implications for VAT of the considerably larger underground or shadow economies found in Albania as compared to developed countries. Some analysis suggests that in the presence of a substantial 'informal' sector, a tax like VAT that falls on the formal sector acts to deter the growth and development of the economy as a whole. Increasing consumption taxes definitely fosters the expansion of the hidden economy if the labor-intensity of production in that sector is greater than in the formal sector. The present government need for revenues suggest that even government aware of such problems may have nonetheless choose to impose higher taxes, including VAT, on the formal sector of the economy because with their relatively weak tax administrations the best way for them to raise revenue may be to increase barriers to entry to the formal sector, thus creating 'rents' that may then be taxed.
How far Albania still seems to be from being able to run their tax systems on this basis? While there are many different reasons for this conclusion in different countries, only two points will be mentioned here. First, the policy process appears, almost inevitably, always to leave some problems in VAT design, and such problems are more likely to be exacerbated over time in the circumstances of Albania than those of developed countries. Secondly, the right way to implement a VAT is through "self-assessment". Potential taxpayers have many ways to escape the fiscal system. They (or at least their tax base) may, for instance, flee abroad. They may remain but hide in the shadow economy. They may secure some form of favorable treatment by exerting influence in various ways to have changes made in the law or its interpretation. If somehow trapped within the taxation system, they may finally seek relief by forgiveness of arrears through partially amnesty laws. Indeed, in some cases they may combine all of these methods of avoiding taxation. In some routine work of our tax administration the record over the years suggests that such processes have been at work, given the discouraging picture of repeated erosion of the base of the VAT through concessions at many levels as well as general administrative weaknesses.
The initial VAT legislation, usually close to standard international models, as time goes on tends to become both more complex and to some extent ad hoc in how it is actually applied. The structure of VAT becomes littered with privileges and exemptions that minimize its revenue impact and make it difficult to manage. Sometimes, once concessions enter the system, they have been subsequently enlarged surreptitiously without quick response from the tax administration, becoming in effect almost a "self- assessment" system without the necessary administrative systems and safeguards to support such a system. Concessions thus feed on themselves, encouraging taxpayers to lobby for still more concessions, just as tax amnesties create an incentive to defer payment in anticipation of future amnesties. Little assistance in coping with these complexities is offered in the way of taxpayer services. Nor is much done to guard against abuse, with most so-called VAT "audits" amounting to little more than simple numerical checks. Widespread base erosion facilitates both evasion and also, when taxpayers are subject to audit, corruption.
Originally, taxes were levied to pay for government expenses. But they underwent a malignant transformation. They began to be used to express social preferences. Tax revenues were diverted to pay for urban renewal, to encourage foreign investments through tax breaks and tax incentives, to enhance social equality by evenly redistributing income and so on. As Big Government became more derided - so were taxes perceived to be its instrument and the tide turned. Suddenly, the fashion was to downsize government, minimize its disruptive involvement in the marketplace and reduce the total tax burden as part of the GNP.
Integration of UTPs with the current taxes payable account presents special challenges. Before FIN 48, tax reserves computed under FAS 5 were typically recorded in the current payable on the theory that the government could demand payment at any time. This meant that refunds and payments due with the filing of the return were co-mingled in the ending balances. Past FIN 48, these items are still included in the ending balances; however, the movement in the UTPs must be disclosed in a separate roll forward using the following prescribed categories: Beg Balance, PY Increase, PY Decrease, CY Increase, CY Decrease, Settlements Expiration.
Recently, however, some have begun to explore in more detail the theoretical framework linking VAT, tariff reform, trade and welfare, turning up some interesting and to some extent disquieting results. Analysts have also recently begun to discuss the implications for VAT of the considerably larger underground or shadow economies found in Albania as compared to developed countries. Some analysis suggests that in the presence of a substantial 'informal' sector, a tax like VAT that falls on the formal sector acts to deter the growth and development of the economy as a whole. Increasing consumption taxes definitely fosters the expansion of the hidden economy if the labor-intensity of production in that sector is greater than in the formal sector. The present government need for revenues suggest that even government aware of such problems may have nonetheless choose to impose higher taxes, including VAT, on the formal sector of the economy because with their relatively weak tax administrations the best way for them to raise revenue may be to increase barriers to entry to the formal sector, thus creating 'rents' that may then be taxed.
How far Albania still seems to be from being able to run their tax systems on this basis? While there are many different reasons for this conclusion in different countries, only two points will be mentioned here. First, the policy process appears, almost inevitably, always to leave some problems in VAT design, and such problems are more likely to be exacerbated over time in the circumstances of Albania than those of developed countries. Secondly, the right way to implement a VAT is through "self-assessment". Potential taxpayers have many ways to escape the fiscal system. They (or at least their tax base) may, for instance, flee abroad. They may remain but hide in the shadow economy. They may secure some form of favorable treatment by exerting influence in various ways to have changes made in the law or its interpretation. If somehow trapped within the taxation system, they may finally seek relief by forgiveness of arrears through partially amnesty laws. Indeed, in some cases they may combine all of these methods of avoiding taxation. In some routine work of our tax administration the record over the years suggests that such processes have been at work, given the discouraging picture of repeated erosion of the base of the VAT through concessions at many levels as well as general administrative weaknesses.
The initial VAT legislation, usually close to standard international models, as time goes on tends to become both more complex and to some extent ad hoc in how it is actually applied. The structure of VAT becomes littered with privileges and exemptions that minimize its revenue impact and make it difficult to manage. Sometimes, once concessions enter the system, they have been subsequently enlarged surreptitiously without quick response from the tax administration, becoming in effect almost a "self- assessment" system without the necessary administrative systems and safeguards to support such a system. Concessions thus feed on themselves, encouraging taxpayers to lobby for still more concessions, just as tax amnesties create an incentive to defer payment in anticipation of future amnesties. Little assistance in coping with these complexities is offered in the way of taxpayer services. Nor is much done to guard against abuse, with most so-called VAT "audits" amounting to little more than simple numerical checks. Widespread base erosion facilitates both evasion and also, when taxpayers are subject to audit, corruption.
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